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F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971)];

May

tween audits is certainly too long.
Id. In addition, the costs of an
e The compromise of $32.5 mil- exhaustive survey may be high.
lion approved in Hartford Hospital Therefore, caution should be taken
v. Chas. Pfizer & Co. [52 F.R.D. not to overdo the audit.
131 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)]; and
It has been suggested that the
audit
should initially consist of a
* The jury award, after trebling,
more
or
less superficial review of
of nearly $29 million in Philadelthe
company's
activities together
phia Electric Co. v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 1964 Trade Cas. with a series of "penetrating spot
checks." Id. at 25. If this examina71, 123 (E.D. Pa.)].
tion does not reveal any antitrust
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE
problems or potential problems,
AGAINST ANTITRUST EXPOSURE the audit may be terminated. If,
The "antitrust audit" is a proce- on the other hand, the opposite
dure that is particularly adapted situation is revealed, an exhaustive
to meeting the need for preventive audit should be undertaken.
maintenance in the area of corporate antitrust exposure. One com- Audit Procedure
It has been observed that, almentator has very aptly and concisely expressed the purposes of though corporate antitrust review
was formerly concentrated on spean antitrust audit:
"[l]ts purpose should be re- cific business practices, it must
garded as being somewhat like now cover a wide range of intracorthat of the financial audits per- porate reports regarding competiformed by certified public accoun- tion, acquisition, new products,
tants. Frequently such financial business development and planaudits disclose nothing not previ- ning, press releases, annual reports
ously known to top management. and other communications to
They constitute, however, a form shareholders, and even releases to
of insurance against unsuspected securities analysts. Loughlin, The
losses." Hale, Antitrust Audits, I Naughty Words of Antitrust, 54
CORP.
PRAC.
COM.
17,
18 A.B.A.J. 246, 247 (1968) [here(1959)
[hereafter
cited
as after cited as "Loughlin"].
Outside counsel should be em"Hale" 1.
ployed to perform the audit in orFrequency and Scope of Audit
der to provide the necessary obThere is no uniform practice as jectivity and to "avoid the negatives
to the frequency of antitrust audits. inherent in policing." See AnderAlthough annual audits may be too son, Effective Antitrust Compliance
frequent, a 10-year interval be- Programsand Procedures(An Out-
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line), 18 Bus. LAW. 739, 745
(1963) [hereafter cited as "Anderson"].
Factsabout Company
and Industry
The first step of the antitrust
audit procedure is to obtain company and industry facts. See Hale,
above, at 18. Outside counsel
should interview corporate officers
and review the files at the client's
principal offices. Indeed, it is advisable that files be kept in central
locations accessible to periodic
spot checks by counsel. VANCISE
& DUNN, How To COMPLY WITH
THE ANTITRUST LAWS

341 (Com-

merce Clearing House, Inc., Chicago, 1954) [hereafter cited, VANCISE & DUNN].

Attention should be given to all
phases of the business. Of course,
the audit should be performed in
cooperation with the corporate
secretary and house counsel, because they are usually extremely
knowledgeable about the company's
day-to-day operations, and their
suggestions will invariably prove
of value to outside counsel. See
Hale, above, at 25.
DOt:UMEN'TS

To

BE

EXAMIINED

In an exhaustive audit, counsel
should examine the following documents and files:
* Minutes of the meetings of the
board of directors and key man-

17

agement committees.
* Files of policy-making executives.
* Previously issued company directives on antitrust subjects.
* Sales
cluding:

Department

files,

in-

--- Reports from the field organization.
-- > Agreements and correspondence with distributors and dealers.
Agreements and correspondence with customers, actual and
potential.
- Sales literature and advertising. In addition to other potential antitrust problems in the wording of advertising (referred to
below), heavy advertising expenditures have been the subject of
judicial scrutiny. See American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781, 797 (1946).

--> Terms of sales "promotions"
(such as offers, for a limited time,
of two items for the price of one).
See National Dairy Prods. Corp.
v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir.
1969); discussion of RobinsonPatman Act 115 U.S.C. §§13, 13a,
13b, 21 a I in the section on "Price
Discrimination," below.

18
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[Antitrust considerations concerning these documents are discussed in the section on "Illegal
Sales Practices," below. I

(Vol. 19-No. 5)

May

-- The agenda and minutes of
trade association meetings; and
--> Trade association publications.

* Files of departments dealing
with suppliers and competitors,
such as accounting and purchasing
departments, including correspondence and agreements.

--* Other matters that should be
examined thoroughly with reference to trade associations are:

e Patent files, patent licenses,
know-how agreements. Outside
counsel and patent counsel should
make a general survey of the company's patent position. See Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Haze/tine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). Accumulating large numbers of patents
may be a problem in and of itself.
See United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954).

1 Price reporting systems.
Compare United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S.
333 (1969); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States,
297 U.S. 553 (1936); and American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921)
with Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n
v. United States, 268 U.S. 563
(1925) and Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 588 (1925).

-* Licenses should be examined
for provisions affecting prices,
production [see United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287
(1948)1, and "grant backs" [see
REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST

LAws227 (1955)].

Trade Association Membership
* Files relating to membership in
trade associations, including:
Reports of those who attended trade association meetings;

1i Collection of statistical information. See Tag Mfrs. Institute
v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (lst Cir.
1949);

LAMB &

ASSOCIATION

SHIELDS, TRADE

LAW AND

PRACTICE

34 et seq. (Little, Brown & Co.,
Boston, rev. ed. 1971) Ihereafter
cited, LAMB & SHIELDS 1.
1 Joint activity with respect
to the extension of credit to customers. United States v. First
National Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S.
44(1930).

11 Group lobbying. Compare
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Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) with
California Motor Transport Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508 (1972). See also United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657, 669-72 (1965).
111Attempts to control competitive practices. See Fashion
Originators' Guild of America,
Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941);
LAMB & SHIELDS, above, at 20
et seq.; product simplification and
standardization is dealt with at 74
et seq. As to a combination to
block technological improvements,
see Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945), clarified in 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
Pricing Practices
9 Price lists and pricing files. Outside counsel may wish to compare
price lists with those of competitors to determine extent of identical pricing.
Although counsel may wish to
look at competitors' price lists, the
authors
strongly
recommend
against company personnel looking
at these price lists. Counsel should
be aware of the tension between
the Robinson-Patman Act [15
U.S.C. §§13, 13a, 13b, 21],which
allows a seller to take into account
its competitor's prices to the extent of "meeting, but not beating,"
those prices, and the Sherman Act

19

[15 U.S.C. §§l-7], which strives
towards differentiated pricing, and
in which conscious parallelismone form of which may be basing
prices on the prices of one's competitors-may be evidence, although not proof, of price-fixing.
Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,
346 U.S. 537 (1954). But see
United States v. Container Corp.
of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969);
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
United States, 260 F.2d 397 (4th
Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 395
(1959); and Morton Salt Co. v.
United States, 235 F.2d 573 (10th
Cir. 1956).
Even if it could be shown that
price-list examination by company
personnel was done to prevent
identity of prices, independent
pricing decisions, without any
knowledge of competitors' prices,
are much more likely, in the long
run, to lead to the differentiated
pricing structure that is the desired
goal of the antitrust laws.
On the other hand, it is desirable
for the seller's salesmen to keep
records of instances in which they
have attempted to verify the allegedly lower prices of their competitors. Such a practice, which
should be the result of written
company policy, will evidence that
this examination of competitors'
prices was not done pursuant to
a general price-fixing scheme, but
rather was done to satisfy the requirements of the proviso to sec-

20
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tion 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman
Act. 15 U.S.C. §13(b). Furthermore, such records will be extremely useful if the company is
ever charged with a RobinsonPatman violation.
-- Counsel should examine fair
trade contracts, if any. The various
provisions of the laws of those
states having fair trade statutes are
set forth in TRADE REG. REI,.
6041-47. See also, United States
v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351
U.S. 305 (1956).

--> With reference to potential
Robinson-Patman Act violations,
counsel should make a careful
examination in the problem areas
listed in the section on "Price Discrimination," below,
Other Documents
* Threats of antitrust action that
have been received, if any, and
letters of complaint from customers or competitors. See Hale,
above, at 19.
* Acquisition and merger files.
" Files relating to joint ventures.
See United States v. Penn-Olin
Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158
(1964).
* Files relating to standardization.
Problems in this area are frequently encountered in connection with
trade associations. See the section

May

on "Trade Association Membership," above.
* Restrictive labor agreements.
See South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidated Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 983 (1971); United States v.
Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n,
1957 Trade Cas. 68,599 (S. D.
N. Y.); United States v. Tobacco
& Candy Jobbers Ass'n, 1954
Trade Cas. 67,798 (D. Ohio).
* Annual reports and stock prospectuses. See Loughlin, above, at
247.
SPECIFI: PROBLEN I AREAS

In checking these documents,
counsel should pay particular attention to the problem areas discussed below. The authors make
no pretense that this outline constitutes anything but the barest
skeleton of antitrust information.
This discussion is intended merely
to give the practitioner an indication of the types of conduct that
should be examined more closely
and of some of the leading cases
in which these practices are discussed and in which standards of
legality are indicated.
Illegal Sales Practices
Among the sales practices that
may be illegal under the antitrust
laws-indications of which may
be contained in certain of the
above corporate documents-are
the following:

1973
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* Tie-in Sales-A requirement
by the seller that the purchaser
buy a second product (the tied
product) as a condition to being
allowed to buy the tying product.
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969);
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. I (1958); International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947). Under Sherman Act §1 115 U.S.C. §II neither the tying nor the tied product
need be a tangible good; it may
also be land, a service agreement,
credit, and the like.

* Marketing New Products-A
course of conduct by a manufacturer of introducing additional
lines in advance of any clear consumer demand, with an intent to
preclude competitors from entering
the market.
In United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America 1148 F.2d 416,
430-31 (2d Cir. 1945)1 the Second
Circuit (per L. Hand, J.), observed: "There were at least one or
two abortive attempts to enter the
industry, but 'Alcoa' effectively
anticipated and forestalled all competition, and succeeded in holding
the field alone. True, it stimulated
demand and opened new uses for
the metal, but not without making
sure that it could supply what it
had evoked. . . .It was not inevitable that it should always anticipate increases in the demand for
ingot and be prepared to supply

21

them. Nothing compelled it to keep
doubling and redoubling its capacity before others entered the field.
It insists that it never excluded
competitors; but we can think of
no more effective exclusion than
progressively to embrace each new
opportunity as it opened, and to
face very newcomer with new
capacity already geared into a
great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel."
The FTC complaint against
Xerox Corporation, announced
Dec. 12, 1972, charges Xerox with
"announcing new copier models and
taking orders thereon before availability of such copiers in response
to introduction of competing copiers by actual or potential competitors." TRAIF R i'O,. Ri1. 120,164,
20,207. See also the complaint in
United States v. International
Business Machines Corp., Civil
No. 69-200 (filed Jan. 17, 1969),
TRADE REG. REP. Transfer Binder,
U.S. Antitrust Cases, Summaries,
Complaints, Indictments, Developments, 196 1-1970, 1145,069 (Case
2039).
e Boycotts and Refuisals To Deal
-Concerted action by a group of
competitors to refuse by buy from,
or sell to, another person or persons unless certain conditions are
met. United States v. General
Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 14547 (1966); Klor's Inc. v. Broad21
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way-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207, 211-12 (1959); FashionOriginators' Guild of America, Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941).
* Reciprocity-An
agreement,
either explicit or implicit, or a
course of conduct of purchasing
from another company because the
company is purchasing other products from the concerned company
or its affiliates, or has the market
potential to do so. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S.
592 (1965); United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 258 F.
Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).

May

product, the distributor or dealer
will not buy the products of the
manufacturer's competitors. Such
agreements are usually coupled
with an agreement by the manufacturer to meet all the distributor's
needs. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.,
384 U.S. 316 (1966); Tampa Elec.
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365
U.S. 320 (1961); Standard Oil
Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293 (1949).

* Leasing--Situations in which
a manufacturer will not offer its
product for sale, but will only
lease it. United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp.
o Restrictive Customer and Terri- 295, 319-25 (D. Mass. 1953),
torial Agreements-Restrictions aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
on the customers to whom, or the (1954); Mid-America ICEE, Inc.
area in which, distributors or v. John E. Mitchell Co., 1972
dealers may sell. Such restrictions Trade Cas. 173,833, at pp. 91,
may either be imposed by a manu- 501-02 (D. Ore. 1971). See also
facturer on its distributors, in FTC complaint against Xerox
which case they are designated Corp., TRADE REG. REP. 20,164,
"vertical"; or they may result from 20,207 (announced Dec. 12, 1972).
an agreement among competing
manufacturers or competing deal- Price Discrimination
ers, in which case they are desigThe following is a list of probnated "horizontal." United States v. lem areas that counsel should
Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 investigate with regard to potential
(1972); United States v. Arnold, violations of the Robinson-Patman
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 Act. For this purpose, it has been
(1967); White Motor Co. v. United suggested that certified public
accountants make sample audits
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
of the company's books. For
o Requirements Contracts-A re- example, the giving of rebates is
striction on a distributor or dealer a practice that certified public
that, as a condition of being al- accountants are trained to detect
lowed to buy the manufacturer's and that may have an important
22
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bearing on the legality of the
client's pricing practices. See Hale,
above, at 19-20.
* The existence of price differences on the same or similar commodities, either with respect to
different territories or different
customers on the same functional
level in the same territory. See
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of
Cal., 395 U.S. 642 (1969); Utah
Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,
386 U.S. 685 (1967); FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966).
e The extension of, and the underlying calculation of, quantity discounts. See FTC v. Morton Salt
Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). Here
too, the services of accountants
may be necessary.
0 Any attempts at "cost justification." See United States v. Borden
Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962).
* Price concessions made to meet
competition. Such concessions are
valid only within narrow limits
and should be studied carefully.
See FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S.
505 (1963); Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
* Payment of "brokerage" to customers. See FTC v. Henry Broch
& Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
* Conditions for the granting of
advertising allowances. Counsel

23

should insure that the client has
instituted a practice of bringing to
the attention of all of its customers
the availability of advertising allowances, special offers, and so forth.
See FTC Guides for Advertising
Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services, 3
TRADE REG. REP. 139,035 (1969),
amended, 50,140 (1972).
* Rendition of services only to
selected customers, or selective
payment therefor. See FTC v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968);
FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co.,
360 U.S. 55 (1959).
9 Policy with respect to return of
goods, and supporting credit
memos.
e Shipments of extra merchandise
for which no charge is made, or at
a reduced price.
Telltale Words in Documents
The prospect of rummaging
through innumerable file drawers
of papers looking for indications
of possible antitrust violations
must seem to most counsel a
Herculean task. However, discovering evidence of possible antitrust violations need not be like
looking for a needle in a haystack.
Counsel should bear in mind that
telltale words in documents are
often indicative of corporate activities that may have adverse antitrust significance.

24
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One commentator has pointed
out that there is a wide variety of
telltale words indicating that a
document is considered a "hot"
antitrust document by its author
[see Loughlin, above, at 247]:

(Vol. 19-No. 5)

may

e "Exploiting" weaknesses of competitors. Competitive weaknesses
should never be conceded to exist.
See Loughlin, above, at 248.
* "Willingness" or "promise" to
adhere to seller's suggested prices.

" "Please destroy after reading";
* "Original-no copies";
* "Personal and confidential"; and
" "For your eyes only."
Other Examples
Here are some other examples
of such telltale words [for many
of which the authors are indebted
to Loughlin, above]:
e "Aggressive" or "unethical" competition, and the use of the word
"legitimate" in similar contexts.
* Objections to customer's purchases of competitor's products.
e "Beating" a smaller competitor's
price.
e "Matching" a competitor's quo-

e Expressions of plan to capture
a specific market share.
9 "Margins were low due to competition, which we expect to be
remedied next year."
e "To you, and to you alone, the
price is (a below cost) $2.00 a
dozen."
9 Advertisement in which corporate sales manager is pictured
and quoted to the effect that the
telephone assisted him a great deal,
particularly when he wanted to
communicate special offers to his
largest customers.
e Advertisement describing a company's strength and importance in
various fields and its plans to
establish positions of comparable
strength in new fields.

tation.
* "Aim to destroy all competition."
" Competitors will have "no objections" or will "go along."
e Sales of more than one product
in a "package deal."

* Investment house reports referring to a corporation's opportunities for expanding sales by effective "trade relations," to its"captive"
customers, to its "virtual monopoly"
as to a specific product, or to its
"inherent advantages" over smaller
competitors. Any company that
24
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knows it is to be the subject of such
a write-up should insist upon an
antitrust evaluation of the proposed report. See Loughlin, above,
at 248.
A

DOCUMENT

RETENTION

PROGRAM

In the course of reviewing a
client's files for documents evidencing policies or acts that may
give rise to antitrust liability, counsel should bear in mind the desirability of instituting a document
retention program. Such programs
have an accepted place today in
corporate administrations. Whiting,
Antitrust and the Corporate Executive 1, 48 VA. L. REV. 11, 14
(1962). One reason for such programs is the economy resulting
from savings of record storage
costs. See Beckstrom, Destruction
of Documents with Federal Antitrust Significance, 61 Nw. U. L.
REV. 687, 688 (1966) [hereafter
cited as "Beckstrom"1.
More important, since a company's internal thought processes
when reduced to writing are subject to discovery by compulstory
process in antitrust cases [FED. R.
Civ. P. 341, any documents no
longer required--either because
of their nature or their ageshould be discarded.
As of March 1972, with respect
to the federal government alone,
there were more than 1,000 statutes and regulations requiring
document retention for periods

25

ranging from 30 days to "permanent." [These requirements are
summarized in Guide to Record
Retention Requirements, 37 Fed.
Reg. 4602 (1972).]
For example, the Internal Revenue Service regulations, while not
aimed at a large variety of documents, specify retention rules that
apply to all businesses. Documents
covered by the IRS regulations
must be retained "so long as the
contents thereof may become material in the administration of any
internal revenue law." Id. at 4635.
Establishing a Program
In establishing a document
retention program for a corporate
client, the document retention
policy must have some specific
guidelines. The actual number of
years of retention should be governed by a "rule of reason." This
may require detailed discussion
with management of the frequency
with which the documents in question are examined, and the harm
to the company from early destruction.
Although it is obviously necessary to conform to statutory
requirements, it is usually desirable not to retain documents any
longer than necessary. The number
of times that documents will be
useful in defending an allegation
of an antitrust violation will probably be outweighed many-fold by
the times that such documents will
be damaging.
25
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Legal Implications of
Document Destruction
In counseling the client on the
subject of destruction of corporate
documents that may contain incriminating evidence, the attorney
may have to act as a moderating
influence, and should even err on
the side of caution, since both common sense and the Canons of Professional Ethics compel the conclusion that the client, not the
lawyer, go to jail. ABA CANON 15
provides in pertinent part that "the
office of attorney does not permit,
much less demand of him for any
client, violation of law or any
manner of fraud or chicane. He
must obey his own conscience, not
that of his client."
To be sure, there is little likelihood that destruction of documents
pursuant to an established document retention program prior to
knowledge of any investigation in
which the documents might be
relevant would lead to prosecution
on any theory of criminal liability.
See Beckstrom, above, at 702-03.
However, it is or may be illegal
to destroy documents in the following circumstances:
* After service of process requiring their production [id. at
691-97];
* In the course of voluntary
cooperation with authorities [id.
at 697-700]; or

May

* After learning of a relevant inquiry but before being contacted
by the authorities [id. at 700-02].
Preservationof Relevant
Documents
Furthermore, since it is or may
be illegal to select certain documents and destroy them under the
circumstances just described, it
would be illegal knowingly to
permit documents to be destroyed
by others pursuant to a previously
arranged destruction program; a
direction to interrupt the program
would be called for. Id. at 704.
See also Grand Jury Investigation
(General Motors Corp.), 1962
Trade Cas. 70,426 (S.D.N.Y.),
where the Justice Department
wrote General Motors that it was
aware of its "document retention
policy" and that "the law precludes
the destruction by General Motors
of any documents which General
Motors has reason to believe may
be sought by the grand jury at a
later date."
When documents are destroyed
under circumstances where it is
unlikely that criminal sanctions for
destruction will follow, it is, of
course, possible that adverse inferences might be drawn from the
fact that the documents had been
destroyed. See Beckstrom, above,
at 687. Further, given the widespread use of modern duplicating
machines, it may be impossible to
locate and destroy all copies of a
26
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document in larger corporations.
These eventualities should be
inputs into the balancing process
in arriving at a determination to
destroy a given document or
documents.
In addition, whatever document
retention program is adopted, it
must be impartial. One commentator has aptly stated: "A company
may not pick and choose between
so-called good and bad documents;
insofar as it elects to submit to
trial by files, those files should
represent an accurate picture of
the transactions involved, for
better or for worse." VANCISE &
DUNN, above, at 341.
RECOMMENDATI ONS
FOLLOWING

AN

AUDI'T

If the audit reveals substantive
antitrust violations or potential
violations, counsel will, of course,
advise the client to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation.
Hale [above, at 24-25] discusses
the dilemma of whether to make
these recommendations orally or
in writing:
"Careful lawyers always prefer
that the opinions which they prepare for their client's guidance be
in written form, rather than expressed orally. Yet, it is often
considered inadvisable to have in
the client's files a catalog of potential antitrust violations. Although
an attorney's opinion letter or
memorandum may be a privileged
communication, there is always a

27

hazard that some employee, unfamiliar with the risks involved,
will permit an investigator to have
access to it. In these circumstances counsel frequently has
found it advisable to have a client's
copy of a written opinion returned
to counsel for destruction after it
has been circulated among the
client's officers."
In addition, counsel should
advise the client to embark on a
comprehensive antitrust compliance program. A full discussion
of antitrust compliance programs
is beyond the scope of this article.
For good discussions of antitrust
compliance programs, see e.g.,
Lipson, How To Implement an
Antitrust Compliance Program,
THE

PRACTICAL

LAWYER,

Dec.

1971, p. 39. See also Anderson,
above, and VANCISE & DUNN,
above.
Educating Management
In many instances, the audit will
reveal to counsel the really appalling ignorance of some high-level
management in even large companies of the nature and scope of
the antitrust laws. In such cases,
counsel should, at the very least,
give some instruction to management-perhaps in the form of a
series of short seminars---concerning the general nature of the antitrust laws and the potential liability thereunder. Such instruction to
management can then be followed
27
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up by policy directives to lowerlevel employees.
It is an old maxim that an ounce
However, counsel should be
aware that even express instruc- of prevention is worth a pound of
tions to corporate employees con- cure. This aphorism is nowhere
cerning obedience to the antitrust more applicable than to the field
laws will not exculpate either the of antitrust, where wise counsel are
corporate entity or high man- daily reminded of the potential
agerial agents if the instructions disasters of governmental actions,
are "general" and no steps have possibly criminal in nature, and
been taken to enforce the instruc- treble-damage litigation. Balanced
tions "by means commensurate with against these considerations, the
the obvious risks." United States antitrust audit is well worth the
v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 1972 costs for professional services
Trade Cas. 74,190 at 92,925 rendered and the possible tem(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 porary slight disruption to the
U.S.L.W. 3389 (U.S. S. Ct., Jan. client's business operations.
16, 1973).

Every responsible corporate program for compliance at least
commences with some review of some areas in which the antitrust
laws apply to the individual corporation. The breadth, depth, and
accuracy of this survey will depend upon the extent to which the
client wishes to insure that counsel has a sound foundation of fact
upon which to build, with his legal tools, an effective compliance
structure ....
Finally, counsel will, if he is wise, check his findings against his
company's files. In this connection the attorney must remember at
all times that the most authoritative advice of compliance, dutifully
followed, may avail little, should a court find that the recommended
lawful acts were undertaken pursuant to some written unlawful
intent.
This legal inventory of antitrust issues will necessarily proceed
item by item. Needless to say, however, at the completion of the
inventory the component corporate items must be carefully fitted
together to form the composite corporate picture, because inoffensive
individual parts may collectively disclose a very different antitrust
totality.
JERROLD

G.

VAN CISE, THE FEDERAL ANrITRUST LAWS

49, 51 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, Washington, D.C., rev. ed. 1965).

